Anthony Cordesman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies has been a reliable source of realistic, reasoned analysis in the fields he studies. FOBA Jim Fallows points to his latest, a relatively brief piece (a couple of screenfuls) entitled “The War in Gaza: Tactical Gains, Strategic Defeat?”
As Fallows says, the question mark is essentially useless. Israel has exposed its own weakness for temporary domestic political gain, very much in the manner of its current patron in the White House. As a result its moral standing is in shreds, like ours, and for the same reasons. This will have exactly the consequences that any idiot could have predicted before the invasion.
One strong warning of the level of anger in the region comes from Prince Turki al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Prince Turki has been the Saudi ambassador in both London and Washington. He has always been a leading voice of moderation. For years he has been a supporter of the Saudi peace process and an advocate of Jewish-Christian-Islamic dialog. Few Arab voices deserve more to be taken seriously, and Prince Turki described the conflict as follows in a speech at the opening of the 6th Gulf Forum on January 6th. “The Bush administration has left you (with) a disgusting legacy and a reckless position towards the massacres and bloodshed of innocents in Gaza … Enough is enough, today we are all Palestinians and we seek martyrdom for God and for Palestine, following those who died in Gaza.” Neither Israel nor the US can gain from a war that produces this reaction from one of the wisest and most moderate voices in the Arab world.
But the US and Israel are currently governed by factions of their respective societies that believe in the harder-hit theory. Briefly, this theory posits that the theorist is part of a group that is righteous, and is opposed by a group that’s evil. Given this moral rectitude, all that’s needed to solve the problem is to engage the enemy. Once this is accomplished, blows will be traded (unless you’ve chosen carefully enough that your opponent is incapable of striking back). Then you’re set: all that remains, goes the theory, is to strike the decisive blow, to hit hard enough, and the other side will capitulate.
Funny thing about this theory: it’s never worked. It’s rarely even successful in individual fights; if you manage to hit me hard enough to cause me to retire, I’ll simply find a different way to hurt you the next time. I’m not about to give up; I’m simply retreating to regroup. You wouldn’t give up. Why do you expect me to? Oh, right, because I’m subhuman. I keep forgetting.
And of course if you’re fighting a large group, the resentment and anger will multiply through intra-social echoes, and an enormous amount of energy will be focused on reprisals of whatever sort can be undertaken.
If you’ve read anything about 4GW, or even paid attention to the best American reporters (not to mention those from elsewhere, who are generally far ahead in these matters), you know that the history shows insurgencies winning in nearly every case. The massive military power assumes on entry that it will win, and if comes to a war of attrition then so be it: we have both God and superior fire power on our side. These assumptions continue to be made by policy makers long after they’ve been discredited by military strategists. It doesn’t turn out that way in fact, no matter what our assumptions are.
This is obvious at the individual level, and should be even more obvious at the social level. But the people who tend to put themselves forward as leaders are generally the most aggressive and impulsive, and often the least reflective. A good system would weed out such people; but corporate-managed democracy encourages, indeed privileges, them.
Especially if, as in the US and Israel, the corporations managing the democracy constitute the country’s war machine. Every society is organized around its war-fighting capacity; otherwise it’s overwhelmed by its neighbors. But my understanding of history is that societies whose economies require war are usually found in the early and late stages. Flourishing societies have industry that isn’t war- or finance-related.
Israeli hawks claim that this invasion of Gaza is defensive, but no military person is silly enough to believe that. You don’t decrease the attacks against your position by reducing the opposition to desperation. In such a situation, you either kill them all, or they will attack with every weapon at their disposal.
This raises a question that every Israeli and its supporters now needs to ask. What is the strategic purpose behind the present fighting? After two weeks of combat Olmert, Livni, and Barak have still not said a word that indicates that Israel will gain strategic or grand strategic benefits, or tactical benefits much larger than the gains it made from selectively striking key Hamas facilities early in the war. In fact, their silence raises haunting questions about whether they will repeat the same massive failures made by Israel’s top political leadership during the Israeli-Hezbollah War in 2006. Has Israel somehow blundered into a steadily escalating war without a clear strategic goal or at least one it can credibly achieve? Will Israel end in empowering an enemy in political terms that it defeated in tactical terms? Will Israel’s actions seriously damage the US position in the region, any hope of peace, as well as moderate Arab regimes and voices in the process?To [be] blunt, the answer so far seems to be yes. To paraphrase a comment about the British government’s management of the British Army in World War I, lions seem to be led by donkeys. If Israel has a credible ceasefire plan that could really secure Gaza, it is not apparent. If Israel has a plan that could credibly destroy and replace Hamas, it is not apparent. If Israel has any plan to help the Gazans and move them back towards peace, it is not apparent. If Israel has any plan to use US or other friendly influence productively, it not apparent.
