Of course, a fundamental part of the non-proliferation bargain is the commitment of the five nuclear States recognized under the non-proliferation treaty — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — to move toward disarmament. Recent agreements between Russia and the United States are commendable, but they should be verifiable and irreversible. A clear road map for nuclear disarmament should be established — starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, and bringing into force the long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

If the global community is serious about bringing nuclear proliferation to a halt, these measures and others should be considered at the non-proliferation treaty review conference next year.

In areas of longstanding conflict like the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction — while never justified — can be expected as long as we fail to introduce alternatives that redress the security deficit. We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security — and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.

When it’s all put this simply, it’s hard to figure out what the hell we’re doing.

Take a look at Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The United States signed that treaty. Has the US “pursued negotiations in good faith … on a treaty of general and complete [nuclear] disarmament”? Of course it hasn’t. US policy has been to tell other countries, “Do what makes it easy for us to control you, not what makes it easy for you to be independent”. Given how much, and how many, nations were beholden to the US after the Second World War, this policy worked for a while, especially when the Soviet Union could be invoked as the boogeyman. These days, overuse and dishonesty have turned the policy into a boy crying wolf.

Truly, it’s not surprising that other countries have decided to attempt to ensure their own territorial integrity by acquiring a weapon even the schoolyard bully would fear: a nuke. This kind of escalation is directly related to bullying and aggression by the strongest power, the only country to mount thousand-bomber raids over cities, and the only country to use nuclear weapons. So far.

When you see Iraq attacked, and North Korea harangued, it’s extremely difficult to avoid the conclusion that you’ll be invaded unless you have a nuclear bomb. If you’re Iran, you’re gonna get that damn bomb built ASAP no matter what it takes. Says Bill Greider:

It’s time for a real public debate, [New York Times reporter David] Sanger suggests. He doesn’t paint a happy picture as he lays out the new power equation of nuclear proliferation — Iran with the bomb becomes the dominant regional power in the Mideast — but he suggests the most plausible option may be “containment.” Working out unsentimental relationships with Iran and other nuclear wannabes means terms that define clearly how far is too far to go. Muddling through sounds less satisfying than war-making, but it worked well enough during the decades of the cold war. At least nobody dropped the big one.

Posted by Chuck Dupree at March 22, 2006 05:58 AM

Email this entry to:


Your email address:


Message (optional):